Moderated by Philippe Li (KEY)

Philippe Li: Before we begin, could you tell us about your recent projects and works?
Mathieu Duchâtel: First, in early December, we are releasing two new reports (link) at Institut Montaigne on extraterritoriality. One is about U. S. extraterritoriality and how it impacts European interests. And the other one, which I co-authored, is about Chinese extraterritoriality and how China, in the past five years, after a political decision by the top leader to actually build a set of extraterritorial legislation, now has a full package of laws which have an extraterritorial dimension by design. And we think that they will use it at some point. And this raises many questions for European companies and various actors. Also, lately I’ve been dealing the European economic security agenda in relation with East Asian states, India and the U. S., to some extent. So, that's the reason why I'm here in Korea now, especially for the meeting ‘Advancing Economic Security Forum’, which is a track 1.5 dialogue involving the United States, South Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, the EU and EU Member States about the different perspectives and priorities that states have on their own economic security agendas, including managing technology transfers, industrial policy, and the broader trade agenda.
Seungjoo Lee: Similar to Mathieu, the topics I work on these days are economic security- related issues. Particularly, I focus on the role of high technology in linking the economy and security. Also, in terms of that analytical lens, I attempt to shed light on the impact of U.S. - China high technology competition on the Indo-Pacific region, including, of course, South Korea. In a similar context, I look into the possibility of South Korea's strategy to enhance cooperation with the so-called 'like-minded countries' in order to deal with the potential risk of economic coercion from great powers.
Philippe Li: After Donald Trump's elections, what implications does it hold for Europe and Korea? Also, what do you think is the perception Korean, French and European people have now at this point about this election?
Mathieu Duchâtel: The EU and its member states have previously worked with the Trump administration. While a preference for a democratic administration is evident in public opinion polls conducted across Europe, we learned from working with the previous Trump administration that managing transatlantic relations and preventing major trade disputes from escalating is possible. On China policy, for example, below the presidential level, key departments in Europe and the US have built a foundation for consensus on many issues, despite an overall disagreement on the use of trade tariffs as leverage. We have observed convergence on issues such as 5G technology and the assessment of Chinese actions on the international stage. Even though it could be more difficult for the Europeans to work with the US administration on the basis of shared democratic values, because there is obviously much less interest in the Trump administration in conducting a foreign policy based on values-, there are shared interests that are quite solid.
As I see it, two key factors will shape the future of transatlantic relations during the Trump administration. First, the European security order, particularly regarding Ukraine, remains uncertain. The level of pressure on European members to increase defense spending (way beyond two percent of the GDP) and the nature of potential deals on Ukraine remain to be seen. While the idea that Europe will be completely marginalized is likely overly pessimistic, the potential for increased pressure on Europe taking responsibility for deterring future aggression in Europe is high.
Second, trade policy will be crucial, and here there are two questions. First, the level of pressure to align on China policy, and second, whether or not there will be tariffs against the EU, and if there are tariffs against the EU, whether it will be a universal 10% tariff on all goods imported from the EU, or targeted tariffs towards the sectors that the US is very unhappy with, such as the German automotive industry, French and Italian luxury products, etc.
What we already see with the first Trump visits overseas as president-elect, being in France this weekend, is that the political connection is there and that there is an ongoing effort from key EU leaders to build a personalized relationship with President Trump to address those issues. To shorten my answer, I think it’s manageable.
Philippe Li: Just one question about what you’ve just said. You indicated the basic joint stance or position towards China, for US, and Europe. From European perspectives, does it mean that China should be a little bit set apart compared to the US? Also, in the management of the diplomatic and trade relations, how do Europeans expect to manage China if that is the assumption?
Mathieu Duchâtel: I think what has changed since the first Trump administration is the even more central importance of green technologies in the whole U.S.-China-EU relationship. This was evident at the recent COP29 held in Azerbaijan. Europeans face a dilemma regarding imports of Chinese green technologies. On one hand, access to these more affordable goods is crucial for Europe's energy transition. On the other hand, with significant US tariffs on Chinese goods, a redirection of Chinese exports towards the EU could exacerbate existing overproduction issues and the threat to Europe’s own industry.
Europe will need to make a strategic decision on how we deal with imports of Chinese clean tech. Refusing alignment with the US by keeping markets open for the sake of the energy transition is one option. Another is exploring a middle ground. While the leadership of the European Commission may favor alignment, resistance from member states is likely. Our pessimistic assessment would be that it risks being a little bit messy around how to approach imports of Chinese clean tech in Europe.
"I think what has changed since the first Trump administration is the even more central importance of green technologies in the whole U.S.-China-EU relationship."
Seungjoo Lee: I agree with Mathieu. While navigating the second Trump administration will be possible for South Korea, it will present significant challenges.
Firstly, the Trump administration's emphasis on "strategic decoupling" will differ significantly from the Biden administration's "de-risking" approach. This will likely increase pressure on South Korea to align its policies more closely with US policies.
Secondly, unlike the initial shock of Trump's first election, his re-election now reflects a mainstreaming of his political stance and policies within the Republican Party. A new coalition has emerged, uniting Trump's core supporters with a younger generation of Republicans, solidifying his political power. This strengthened position will enable the administration to pursue its agenda more actively, including seeking "new bargains" with allies like South Korea.
The Trump administration views existing alliances as unsustainable and inequitable, necessitating a renegotiation of terms. This will likely place significant pressure on South Korea to contribute more to the bilateral alliance.
In conclusion, South Korea will face increased pressure in the coming years (at least one or two) to adapt to the demands of this new approach, particularly in the lead-up to the next midterm elections.
"The Trump administration views existing alliances as unsustainable and inequitable, necessitating a renegotiation of terms. This will likely place significant pressure on South Korea to contribute more to the bilateral alliance."
Philippe Li: So, when you say 'new alliance, new bargain,' is this a concept shared between the U.S. and Korea?
Seungjoo Lee: At least from Republican-oriented think tanks in the U.S. As I said earlier, many Republicans, particularly young Republicans, and Republican-oriented think tanks are trying to provide a logical foundation for Trump's policies. That is a clear difference between the first Trump administration and Trump 2.0.
Philippe Li: So, do you believe that the “new alliance, new bargain” applies to Korea or to all other countries?
Seungjoo Lee: It applies to many of the traditional allies. South Korea with its high tech capabilities is one of the few countries that can contribute U.S. attempts to sustain its global dominance. In that regard, the Trump administration will request or even demand that South Korea contributes to these efforts, including modernizing the US military.
This is evident considering the recent phone call made between President-elect Trump and the Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, where one single issue was specifically mentioned: South Korea’s shipbuilding industry and MRO services can contribute in renovating or innovating the U.S. Naval power. There are not many countries in the world that can contribute to that kind of U.S. efforts.
"South Korea with its high tech capabilities is one of the few countries that can contribute U.S. attempts to sustain its global dominance. In that regard, the Trump administration will request or even demand that South Korea contributes to these efforts, including modernizing the US military."
Philippe Li: Getting back to the U.S.-China confrontation, what repercussions does the conflict have for Korea and Europe, and what types of adjustments have you observed as a result of that contest? Do you perceive these changes as negative or as opportunities?

Mathieu Duchâtel: During the first Trump administration, we, in Europe, had to deal for the first time with the U.S.effort to deny China’s access to advanced technology, beginning with Huawei. The U.S. tried to find an effective solution for preventing its allies from adopting Chinese 5G technology. This approach started with huge diplomatic pressure, which was not very effective. The Trump administration decided to move in denying access to semiconductor technology to Huawei, which proved to be much more effective. Take Sweden, for example. Initially hesitant to align with the U.S., Sweden shifted its stance after Huawei's access to semiconductors was restricted, explaining that there were too many uncertainties regarding its reliability as a telecommunications provider.
This approach proved to be much more effective than diplomatic pressure alone. Testing technology transfers as a central weapon to promote allied alignment on China policy. This really developed enormously in the last eight years, under the Biden administration as well. I think we are still on that path of increasingly broadening the scope of denying China's access to advanced technology. It started with semiconductors then developed into AI and quantum and it is very likely to go much further under the second Trump administration. I don't think that Europe is well-equipped to confront that kind of political approach. Ursula von der Leyen, The European Commission President is already aligned. She is the European leader who, for the first time, articulated the link between access to European technology and the People's Liberation Army modernization.
Regarding Korea, the 'action for action' proposal during the Trump administration's North Korea policy is a relevant example. This approach, which involved a freeze at Yongbyon in exchange for scaled-down sanctions, raised concerns among denuclearization experts that it could legitimize North Korea's nuclear program.
This episode highlights the significance of internal dynamics within the U.S. government. While the President holds views, the administration plays a crucial role in shaping policy. This is evident in the case of the 'action for action' proposal, where individuals within the first Trump administration reportedly opposed the approach and ultimately prevailed, suggesting that senior policy-makers can persuade the President to change course.
"This approach proved to be much more effective than diplomatic pressure alone. Testing technology transfers as a central weapon to promote allied alignment on China policy."
Seungjoo Lee: The U.S.-China confrontation presents a complex picture for South Korea, offering both opportunities as well as challenges. South Korea had to reduce its exposure to China, particularly in terms of trade dependence. For the last two to three years, South Korea's trade dependence on China has very rapidly declined from around 25 percent to around 19 percent - a 6 percentage point decline in a short span of time. That was quite a challenging issue from the perspective of South Korea.
But one positive aspect is that, major Korean companies have demonstrated competitiveness despite reducing their reliance on the Chinese market. For instance, Hyundai-Kia Motor Groups emerged as the number three automaker in the world, and Samsung Electronics continues to compete effectively with the Apple for the top position in the global smart phone market.
Secondly, South Korea has strengthened cooperation with the United States, as demonstrated in the case of Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix's decision to make a huge investment in the U.S. to construct semiconductor facilities. While this strengthened bilateral relations, the reality is complicated and complex because it created a huge trade imbalance between the two countries. That's going to be another challenging issue when we have the new Trump administration as it will be one of the top priorities from the perspective of the Trump administration.
At the same time, if we look at President-elect Trump's campaign promise, it is very likely that his administration will impose 60 percent or even higher tariffs on China. That may give some advantage to South Korean companies, allowing them to increase their market share in the U.S, particularly in the EV markets and the battery markets, and some of the major export industries of South Korea. The key challenge for South Korean companies will be to effectively capitalize on these potential opportunities
However, the downside is that if the U.S. government really imposes 60 percent tariffs on China, in response, Chinese companies would have to find new opportunities in third-market countries, intensifying competition with South Korean companies. Ultimately, a balanced view is crucial when assessing the impact of the U.S.-China competition on South Korea.
"That may give some advantage to South Korean companies, allowing them to increase their market share in the U.S, particularly in the EV markets and the battery markets, and some of the major export industries of South Korea."
Philippe Li: Do you believe the Camp David Summit will fundamentally alter the regional security dynamics in Northeast Asia, leading to a new era of trilateral cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and Korea?
Seungjoo Lee: Camp David Agreement is a defining moment for trilateral cooperation, particularly by revitalizing Korea-Japan relations. There are many implications. The first one is that it completes the trilateral framework where Korea-Japan cooperation was the missing link for several years.
Furthermore, the summit has facilitated the upgrade of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Traditionally security-focused, the alliance is now transitioning into a more strategic and comprehensive partnership, encompassing high-tech industries like semiconductors and batteries.
Moving forward, a key challenge is to further evolve this partnership into a "tech alliance," as South Korea taps into the U.S. innovation system to enhance its own technological competitiveness. This requires sustained effort from both countries to upgrade the alliance to the next level.
Philippe Li: So, you seem to think that this is a new traction for Korea towards the US?
Seungjoo Lee: A key aspect of the current high-tech bilateral cooperation has been supporting the U.S.'s reshoring efforts. Given the decline of U.S. manufacturing, South Korea has been well-positioned to fill critical gaps in U.S. industrial base. This has been a significant driver of the current 'production alliance'. However, it's now time to elevate this partnership to a new level. We need to transition towards a more 'tech-intensive alliance'.
Philippe Li: You said 'two countries,' but you don't mention Japan. So, what is the role of Japan?
Seungjoo Lee: The Camp David Agreement significantly revitalized the Korea-Japan cooperation. This includes the resumption of the so-called ‘shuttle diplomacy’ between leaders, particularly with President Yoon Seok-yeol, the Prime Minister Kishida. This symbolically demonstrates a closer bilateral cooperation.
Furthermore, within the trilateral framework, Korea and Japan have initiated economic security dialogues, including launching a pilot project of the early warning system. This signifies a meaningful improvement in the bilateral alliance.
Also, President Biden made a lot of efforts to make this cooperative scheme irreversible. While the future remains uncertain, particularly with the incoming Trump administration, the benefits of the trilateral alliance, in terms of containing China, may discourage the U.S. from reversing this course.
"While the future remains uncertain, particularly with the incoming Trump administration, the benefits of the trilateral alliance, in terms of containing China, may discourage the U.S. from reversing this course."
Mathieu Duchâtel: I think, in this triangle, probably the most stable element in favor of triangular cooperation formats is Japan. On the U.S. side, the trilateral formats are really a signature of the Biden administration. And we know the distinctive preference of Trump for bilateral transactional foreign policy. So, I would question the long-term commitments of the United States to that format at the high political level.
I think that on the Korean side, there are many questions regarding the politicization of relations with Japan, and there are possible ups and downs in the coming years. So, there are questions, but I would agree with Professor Lee that on the geoeconomics dimension, what has already been triggered in terms of aligning on restrictive policies on technology and policies that reduce vulnerabilities and exposure to China as a market, as a production site, and as a supply chain partner have already been triggered and are now structural, especially for the private sector in Korea, Japan, Europe, and elsewhere.
So, I think the geoeconomics foundation for trilateral cooperation is almost structural by now, which is not the case for the hard security elements of the triangular cooperation, for example, on intelligence. There are many questions regarding, how Korea, for example, will approach a possible crisis in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait. Given the level of polarization, it really depends on who is in power. In the case of Japan, it's more predictable that there is, a stake that all parties accept in hard security in the region. So, this is a difference.
From a European perspective, I think there is a need for a framework that includes Japan, Korea, and Europe in an economic security cooperation format. I think, to some extent, the G7 is the forum that plays that role now. It really aligns its members and also its participating countries. Korea has been participating for three consecutive years now on the economic security agenda. Whether it can be reformed or not will not come from the U.S. under the Trump administration, but maybe it can be initiated by other countries.
There is also the question of the future of IPEF, the Indo-Pacific Framework for Economic Prosperity, that was started by the Biden administration with a real focus on economic security questions, which Europe has not joined. But I think the overall framework that gets everyone together is not really there yet. And the initiative to create one or reform the existing ones will need to come from outside the United States.
"From a European perspective, I think there is a need for a framework that includes Japan, Korea, and Europe in an economic security cooperation format."
Seungjoo Lee: One thing I would like to add is that the trilateral cooperation doesn't have to be anti-China. It can also serve as a mechanism for providing public goods, at the regional level or even at the global level. One example is the launch of a pilot early warning system for supply chains that has garnered interest from many European countries. This demonstrates that supply chain resilience efforts can benefit all participating countries and do not necessarily target any specific nation. In this sense, trilateral cooperation can be viewed as a cooperative scheme for addressing global challenges.

Philippe Li: How do you explain the recent surge in EU regulations, particularly those with extraterritorial effects? How should Korean and Asian companies adjust their approach to engaging with the European market in light of these developments?
Mathieu Duchâtel: I think a fundamental shift is under way regarding the EU single market and the starting point was the realization that there had been naive openness on the side of the Europeans and that there should be a more strategic approach in allowing access to the European single market, European technologies, and investing in the EU. For the Commission, it's already been a paradigmatic shift, and it’s been a difficult one. You have noticed that the EU Commissioner for Trade is now called the EU Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security. When you know that free trade is really the DNA of the European Union, I think it's a really deep change. There has been enormous resistance because the prevailing view in Europe was that we had to do everything we could to keep all markets open and to focus on free trade, and deepening free trade with all our partners.
But the realization that this was not a shared view has pushed Europe to be more defensive. And I think that's the reason why you have seen very hectic efforts in the past five years to build a number of instruments that better regulate access to the European market. To use the EU language, it is called ‘open strategic autonomy’. The word 'open' is important here. It comes from the trade side of the European Union, which really didn't want the rest of the world to believe that the EU was no longer open. And indeed, the EU is still open, but the regulation of the market is more comprehensive and addresses many sides of access to the European market. I think some of those instruments, like FDI screening, was long overdue. And I think companies have already adjusted to the existence of an FDI screening mechanism at the EU level. The ones that have a clear extraterritorial dimension are the ones related to due diligence and to the digital market.
For Asian companies investing in Europe, the ones that have had the deepest effect so far are the FDI screening regulation and the anti-subsidy regulation, which are starting to be used, mostly in the context of EU-China relations for the latter. More anti-subsidy action targeting Chinese state capitalism practices seems unavoidable in the coming years.
I believe the EU's new international procurement instrument could have a significant impact in the future. This instrument aims to ensure reciprocal market access for European companies in third countries. It's being used for the first time this year with an investigation in Chinese procurement for medical devices, a sector with restricted access for European companies. So, should we call this an extraterritorial dimension of European legislation? This instrument essentially seeks to set terms in economic relations with China and impose reciprocity, drawing an equivalence with access for Chinese companies in European public markets.
In sum, the past five years have been about building those instruments, and the next five years are going to be about using those instruments.
"For Asian companies investing in Europe, the ones that have had the deepest effect so far are the FDI screening regulation and the anti-subsidy regulation, which are starting to be used, mostly in the context of EU-China relations for the latter."
Seungjoo Lee: The EU has taken a leading role in climate action, creating significant opportunities for cooperation with South Koreain green transformation.
Initially, the EU decided to ban the sales of internal combustion engine cars by 2035, and now it is in the process of revising that plan. This policy uncertainty poses challenges for Korean automakers, as they require long-term planning horizons (at least three to five years) and are sensitive to sudden policy shifts. I think both sides should better coordinate in terms of how to implement climate change-related actions, and that would be another area where both countries tightly cooperate and coordinate. For example,
Instead of relying on protectionism from the E.U. to address the influx of Chinese EVs, it would be better to focus on positioning South Korean automakers as competitive alternatives. This requires closer coordination between South Korea and the EU on climate action policies and a continued commitment to free trade-oriented solutions.
"Instead of relying on protectionism from the E.U. to address the influx of Chinese EVs, it would be better to focus on positioning South Korean automakers as competitive alternatives."
Mathieu Duchâtel: I think we will know soon whether the EU's entire subsidy tariffs on imports of Chinese EVs are compatible with the WTO or not. But one thing is clear: they have been designed to be compatible with the WTO. So it's not a protectionist move. I think it's really an adjustment to reality; there's a heavily subsidized electric vehicles sector in China, which creates huge market distortions.
Seungjoo Lee: I believe that fostering increased competition among EV manufacturers, not just within the European market but globally, is a more sustainable approach.

Philippe Li: Why has the importance of supply chains increased, and how does this relate to sovereignty? How will sovereignty shape future public policies and impact the private sector?
Seungjoo Lee: While some view supply chain strategy through the lens of economic efficiency, many have adopted a securitized approach, prioritizing the reduction of vulnerabilities. This shift represents a significant paradigm change. Previously, global value chains focused primarily on maximizing efficiency. Now, the emphasis lies on building resilient and robust supply chains at the national and company levels. This underscores the critical need for continued collaboration between the government and private sector."
Mathieu Duchâtel: Supply chain management has become central because everyone realized that they were extremely vulnerable. Disruptions and the weaponization of supply chain dependencies in geopolitical competition have made this issue salient. So, I fully agree that the main aim of supply chain management policy is to mitigate vulnerabilities.
From a European perspective, what is really striking is that, while supply chain questions are at the top of the political agenda, in practice, the private sector has been on the front line of action. Actually, private companies are the ones that take the lion's share in reducing vulnerabilities because they have visibility on their own supply chain network of suppliers. Previously, they didn't really look into that seriously, but now they are proactively addressing risks, such as creating supplier redundancy and removing bottlenecks – especially the largest industrial players.
I think here there is a specificity of the European case in comparison with Korea, or any nation state, as European companies are reluctant to share supply chain information with European institutions because there are too many risks of information leaks to third parties. This presents a significant challenge for the European Commission to effectively assist companies address their vulnerabilities.
Finally, in the European context, using the word sovereignty to talk about supply chains is a little bit tricky because the word is extremely politicized in Europe. On the one hand, you have the advocates of national sovereignty, and on the other hand, you have the advocates of European sovereignty. So, I would argue that the economic security framework is the one that navigates the best the complicated politics of sovereignty in Europe, by refocusing on finding practical solutions to Europe’s supply chains risks. Furthermore, complete "supply chain sovereignty" is unrealistic for critical sectors like biotechs, semiconductors, and even green technologies, critical materials where it is just not going to happen. The focus should be on managing and reducing dependencies rather than pursuing complete reshoring within Europe. But building enhanced industrial ecosystems in Europe for these strategic sectors should be part of the solution, and a priority of policy-makers.
"I think here there is a specificity of the European case in comparison with Korea, or any nation state, as European companies are reluctant to share supply chain information with European institutions because there are too many risks of information leaks to third parties."
Seungjoo Lee: I'd like to further elaborate on the securitization of supply chains I mentioned earlier. By securitization, I mean that countries are tempted to increase the number of structurally vulnerable items requiring special strategic management by the government. While under-securitization poses risks, over-securitization is even more dangerous. Finding the proper level of securitization is crucial, as we cannot securitize everything and the days of efficiency paradigm are now over.
This drive to reduce structural vulnerabilities is a key factor behind the resurgence of industrial policy. Although it was previously considered taboo, industrial policy is now actively pursued in countries like the U.S., EU, and Japan. This includes unprecedented measures such as providing financial support to foreign companies, as exemplified by Japan's support for TSMC. This significant shift is driven by the recognition of the need to strengthen manufacturing foundations and address critical vulnerabilities.
"While under-securitization poses risks, over-securitization is even more dangerous. Finding the proper level of securitization is crucial, as we cannot securitize everything and the days of efficiency paradigm are now over."
Philippe Li: So, what does the future hold for international trade?
Mathieu Duchâtel: The centrality of tariffs in US foreign policy poses a significant challenge to international trade Europe and Korea are among the few countries strongly advocating for a robust multilateral trading system, centered around the WTO . The Von der Leyen roadmap emphasizes this commitment, prioritizing the finalization of ongoing free trade negotiations with India, Thailand, and Indonesia. However, public skepticism towards free trade within Europe presents a significant hurdle in ratifying these agreements. From a European perspective, free trade is a challenge both from the outside (US trade policies) and inside (public opinion). But there is still a strategic emphasis on free trade as an element of prosperity for the EU.
What strikes me, being in Korea, is the discussion about the notion that the EU should consider joining the CPTPP or RCEP. This reflects a desire to counterbalance the US trade policy by expanding free trade blocs. But the reason why the EU didn't join in the first place was that those agreements precisely were not ambitious enough. And I don't see a clear change in mindset in Europe regarding those multilateral trade agreements, even though you here more often the argument that we should not be unrealistic by insisting on very ambitious trade agreements.
At the same time, there's also a new branch of European external economic policy mirroring certain aspects of the US approach, trying to deepen economic relations with agreements that do not include market access.
The Trade and Technology Council with India serves as a prime example, established as an alternative approach when free trade negotiations proved to be highly challenging. We set up a different discussion format, creating conditions for private sector transactions, technology, etc. This alternative route demonstrates the EU’s efforts to adjust to the reality where US support for traditional free trade agreements is no longer part of the strategic equation that Europe faces.
"At the same time, there's also a new branch of European external economic policy mirroring certain aspects of the US approach, trying to deepen economic relations with agreements that do not include market access."
Seungjoo Lee: At the risk of oversimplification, the global trade order is likely to become increasingly fragmented, as suggested by the World Economic Forum. This fragmentation may lead to the emergence of two or three major trading blocs: one centered around the United States, another around China, and potentially a third led by the EU.
A McKinsey report highlighted a significant shift in trade patterns over the past seven years. One of the findings is that many countries have increased trade with geopolitically close countries. For example, the United States has increased trade with Korea and Japan while decreasing trade with China. This trend is likely to continue as the global trading order fragments. China has also pursued a similar strategy, increasing trade with geopolitically close countries, or those participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. Despite this set of changes, it is projected that Southeast Asia is poised to emerge as a crucial hub for global trade and production, attracting increased trade flows from countries across the globe, including the EU.
Philippe Li: How do you interpret the North Korea-Russia alliance? What is your assessment of North Korea’s current stance?
Seungjoo Lee: I’m not an expert on this issue, I can offer some observations. North Korea has a very long history of maneuvering between China and Russia (dating back to the 1960s), a key survival strategy. Kim Jong-un, perceiving insufficient support from China, has turned to Russia for alternative cooperation, effectively re-establishing a triangular system among the three countries. This enhances North Korea’s maneuvering room.
Also, The North Korea-Russia relationship is characterized by mutual benefit. Russia needs North Korea's support in Ukraine, while North Korea seeks advanced missile technologies from Russia, which China is less willing to provide unconditionally. From North Korea’s perspective, Russia is much more willing to provide such technology which strengthens North Korea's position in negotiations with the United States and South Korea.
"Russia needs North Korea's support in Ukraine, while North Korea seeks advanced missile technologies from Russia, which China is less willing to provide unconditionally."
Mathieu Duchâtel: There's a word in French to describe this situation: “Effet d’aubaine” - it’s really more than an opportunity; it’s almost like a miracle that North Korea was able to exploit the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Because very immediately, it really shields North Korea from further UN sanctions with the UN Security Council no longer actively enforcing sanctions against the country. This has allowed North Korea greater freedom to advance its missile technology, a stark contrast to the period of heavy sanctions following previous nuclear tests. I think they have broken away from the extreme pressure they were under as a result of their support for Russia.
While the exact nature of Russian technology transfers to North Korea remains unclear, potential areas include missile and submarine technologies. North Korea's pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines, if successful, would have serious implications for regional security, particularly for South Korea. Finally, in terms of EU-South Korea relations, having North Korea fighting for Russia under Article Four of their mutual treaty, but not fighting on Ukrainian soil or on Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine, has been a shock for Europeans. It's the first time an Asian army is actually fighting on European soil since Genghis Khan and I think it creates space for deepening EU-South Korea defense cooperation - beyond what is already happening between the ROK and Poland. We see more and more joint production, like joint ventures in metals, for example.
While South Korea remains extremely cautious due to various threats Russia can pose to South Korean national security, the growing likelihood of a two-front scenario necessitates increased South Korean contributions to Ukrainian defense efforts. This situation will inevitably drive closer defense cooperation between South Korea and the EU.
"It's the first time an Asian army is actually fighting on European soil since Genghis Khan and I think it creates space for deepening EU-South Korea defense cooperation - beyond what is already happening between the ROK and Poland."
About the interviewees
Seungjoo Lee
Mathieu Duchâtel
Comments